Lord Palmerstons Achievements as Foreign Secretary

Lord Palmerstons Achievements as abroad secretaireAssess the achievement of Palmerstons first period at the Foreign Office, between 1830 and 1841.Viscount Palmerston was, with erupt doubt, one of the most famous foreign secretaries ever to have held the office- and he did so on two occasions- between 1830-41, and 1846-52. As with much famous figures he is also instead a contr everyplacesial one, receiving a mixture of praise and critical review from historians. Anthony Wood slackly sees him as a dextrous negotiator, who threatened to purpose force in a judicious and responsible stylus1. Eric Evans, on the other hand, is more inclined to see Palmerstons obvious sabre rattling and Gun Boat diplomacy as an irresponsible and unprincipled pursuit of the National interest2 that worsen diplomatic wounds (especially with the cut) and left Lord Aberdeen (when he took over in 1841) to pick up the pieces3. The function of this look for will be to evaluate Palmertons achievement s in the first (and perhaps more influential) period below the premierships of Earl Grey and Lord Melborne in light of this historiographical debate.This essay will adopt a chronological social organisation to facilitate the clarity of discussion. It will cover the three most famous events in British Foreign affairs in this period- the Belgium Crisis of 1830-1, the creation of the Quadruple Alliance in 1834, the finally the Egyptian Crises c at a timerning France and Russia from 1831-41. It will consequently assess if, on balance, Palemerstons first period at the Foreign Office can generally be called a success, as argued by Wood, or in fact did more harm than good- as argued by Evans.Palmerstons general attitude to foreign affairs was famously one of the pursuit of study self-interest above the caution of any kind of consistent, or ethical position. He told the House of ballparkWe have no eternal allies, we have no perpetual enemies. Our interests are eternal and perpetual, a nd those interests it is our duty to postdateFor Evans, this was attitude represented a carte blance form of pragmatism. Palmerston was able to wrap himself in the union jack- ofttimes mobilising British public opinion behind him- and effectively conduct himself as he pleased with pocketable regard for the sovereignty or stability of other nations- and most importantly- without any regard for long term-worsening of diplomatic relations.This cost was first demonstrated in respect of the Crisis in Belgium in 1830-1. In the Congress of capital of Austria in 1815, Belgium had been placed under the United Provinces of the Dutch- ignoring the obvious differences in religion and national feeling4. Eventually, Belgium Patriots were able to benefit enough support to drive out the Dutch garrison from Brussels. King Louis Phillipe, who had come to power in France in 1830, was known to favour a satellite Belgium state under a French protectorate- although it was extraterrestrial being as t he extent the French were prepared to use military force to get it. At a London conference in 1831, Palmerston found himself in a difficult position- exactly refused to hand over two fortresses on the Belgium border to the French- thus ensuring the creation of a neutral Belgium. Some months later, after the French posted troops inside Belgium, Palmerston let it be known that he would be prepared to use force against them if they did non withdraw5. The French could not take this risk, and retreated. A agreement was signed in celestial latitude 1832, establishing an international guarantee of Belgiums neutrality.On the face of it, this seemed like a triumph for Palmeston. It could be argued that he had played the game of diplomatic bluff to perfection, and by refusing to assent to French demands and sabre rattling, had achieved a solvent most inkeeping with his goal of maintaining British national interest- and one which ensured a potentially dangerous French power-base did not gr ow any more menacing. However, there was no doubt that Lord Pumicestones abrasive qualities had work Anglo-French relations and perhaps a more delicate and consensual stance mightiness have yielded a more satisfactory outcome to all sidesThe diplomatic problems with France did not go away. In 1834, the Queens of Spain and Portugal (who were extreme rulers) were threatened by absolutist regimes in their own countries- and Palmerston was suspicious that the French planned to take advantage. His judgment to create a Quadruple Alliance between all four countries seemed, on the face of it, another(prenominal) great success. France could not diplomatically refuse an alliance al empathizey agreed to by Britain, Spain, and Portugal6, and was seemingly once again outmanoeuvred by what Palmerston called a Capital Hit all of my own doing (He was not known for his modesty). Palmerston had ever so been unequivocal in his support for Constitutional rulers, and Britains self-interest was arg uably sustained by the maintenance of moderate regimes in the Iberian Peninsula7. On this occasion, he had arguably used diplomatic guile rather than the implied threat of military force to achieve success- so it can perhaps be s avail that Palmerston was on occasion prepared to dock his gunboat for a spot of peaceful diplomacy. Once again, though, the price of safeguarding British Interests had worsened Anglo-French relations.In 1831, Mehemet Ali, a rebellious vassal of the Turkish Sultan Mahmud in Egypt, declared war and took possession of promised land and Syria from the Turkish Empire. The Russians- in offering to help forced the beleaguered Sultan to sign a rough treaty which effectively passed control of the strategically vital Unkiar Skelessi Straits to them. Palmerston was worried about an escalation of Russian influence- as it heightened his fearfulness of a potential alliance between Russia and France. In 1839, the Sultan made an ill-advised attack on Ali, and ended up suffering an ignominious defeat, and gave the vassal his excuse to carry the war deep into Turkish territory. It was Palmerstons policy to support Turkey, mainly because it dispersed the power base of Europe, and also because of a latterly signed commercial treaty between the two nations. The Turkish town of Aden (which had the added benefit of being a useful place for British steamships to replenish their coal stocks en route to India) was placed under a British protectorate. Rather predictably, the French sided with Mehemet Ali. Palmerston offered a deal to his enemies- that Ali could retain Egypt and Syria for his lifetime, nevertheless the French encouraged him to treat it down. Palmerston refused to climb down, and instructed Lord Granville (the British Ambassador in Paris) toCovey to him (King Louis Phillipe) in the most friendly and unoffensive manner possiblethat if France begins a war, she will lose her ships, colonies and commerce before she sees the end of it that her army of Algiers will throw overboard to give her anxiety, and that Mehemet Ali will be chucked into the Nile8This uncompromising stance once again was a gamble, made more intense when British Marines helped capture the cities of Acre and Beirut after Ali rejected Palmerstons deal. France (also worried by weighty movements in Bavaria) was in no position to engage Britain in a war, and she ended up having to aid Britain and Russia to defeat Ali9. Eventually, Russia was even persuaded to relinquish control of the Straits, and all four powers agreed to return to the original hamlet of 180910. Disaster had seemingly been diverted again by Palmerstons tough diplomatic line. For Wood, he had read Frances hand perfectly11, and once again maintained peace, even if (for Evans) he had put several noses out of joint with more Gun Boat Diplomacy12.In Conclusion, this essay has shown that Palmerstons abrasive overture to Foreign policy was generally a great success. In each of the three inst ances covered, his reluctance to via media worked in Britains interests, and against those of France- her eternal foe. Undoubtedly, he did prioritise the national interest above all else, but it could be argued that- such was Britains dominance- that her interests and the goal of stability and peace in Europe were by no means unrelated. In fact, one could argue from this evidence that they were very closely linked, and that maybe Palmerstons personality as irresponsible is slightly unfounded.It can be said that Palmerstons hands-on and confrontational approach was extremely risky, and that there was a large element of luck involved in achieving a flourishing outcome on each occasion. For example, had France not withdrawn from Belgium in 1831, a bloody war might have ensured. In 1839, it may only have been the sudden advent of threatening activity in Prussia that made the French swallow their pride, and abandon Mehemet Ali. Palmerston was also aided by his fleet of gunboats that b acked up everything he said. Britains naval dominance at that time allowed him to adopt a far more hard-line and interventionist approach than many other Foreign Secretaries before or since. Overall, Palmerstons guile- backed up by his luck and his powerbase made his period at the Foreign Office between 1830-41 extremely successful, but arguably it could have easily gone horribly wrong.BibliographyWood, A, Lord Palmerston at the Foreign Office 1830-41 in Nineteenth Century Britain , 1960, LongmanDroz, J, Europe between Revolutions 1815-48, 1967, Fontana/CollinsEvans, E, Influence without Entanglement Foreign Affairs, 1815-46 in The hammer of the Modern State 1783-1870, 1983, LongmanFelling, K, A History of England, 1973, Book Club AssociatesRoberts, J, A History of Europe, 1996, Helicon createWord-Count- 16201Footnotes1 mark off Wood, Lord Palmerston at the Foreign Office 1830-41 in Nineteenth Century Britain , 1960, pp.156-632 See Evans, Influence without Entanglement Foreign A ffairs, 1815-46 in The Forging of the Modern State 1783-1870, 1983, pp.210-33 ibid, p.2114 Wood, pp.157-85 In a letter to Granville, he wrote The French must go out of Belgium or we have a general state of war. See Wood, p. 1596 Droz, Europe between Revolutions 1815-48, 1967, p.2367 Evans, p.2118 See Evans p. 211, also Wood, p.1579 Felling, A History of England, 1973, p. 85610 Wood, p.16311 ibid12 Evans, p.211